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SPIN DOCTORS: PROSECUTOR SOPHISTRY AND THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF 
Michael D. Cicchini* 
Spin Doctor: “a person employed . . . to use spin in interpreting 
information or events so as to present them in a favorable light.”1 
 
Sophistry: “the use of fallacious arguments, especially with the 
intention of deceiving.”2 
 
Prosecutors have developed several tactics to effectively lower the 
burden of proof in criminal trials. One such tactic is to argue to jurors 
that they should “search for the truth” of what they think happened. Some 
trial courts are complicit in this effort, and formally instruct jurors “not 
to search for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth.” Defense 
lawyers have objected to these truth-based arguments and instructions, 
as such language improperly lowers the burden of proof below the 
reasonable doubt standard. Prosecutors, however, have dismissed these 
objections as pure speculation. 
In response to this apparent call for evidence, Dr. Lawrence T. White 
and I empirically tested the effect of these truth-based jury instructions 
on verdicts. In two recently published studies, mock jurors who received 
truth-based instructions convicted at significantly higher rates than those 
who were simply instructed on reasonable doubt. Jurors who received the 
truth-based instructions were also far more likely to mistakenly believe it 
was proper to convict even if they had a reasonable doubt about guilt.  
Citing this empirical evidence, defense lawyers have been asking trial 
courts to remove truth-related language from their burden of proof jury 
instructions, and to prohibit prosecutors from making search-for-truth 
arguments to jurors. Prosecutors, however, have responded by attacking 
the validity of the two published studies. 
This Article identifies and debunks these prosecutorial attacks. Its 
purpose is to assist defense lawyers and judges in recognizing and 
responding to invalid prosecutorial arguments, many of which are based 
on a gross misunderstanding of scientific research, blatant 
 
* Criminal Defense Lawyer, Cicchini Law Office, LLC, Kenosha, Wisconsin. J.D., summa cum laude, 
Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., University of Illinois Board of Examiners (1997); 
M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); B.S., University of Wisconsin—Parkside (1990). 
I am grateful to Lawrence T. White, Ph.D., for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. Spin Doctor, Slang, COLLINS DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/spin-doctor. 
 2. Sophistry, DICTIONARY, https://www.google.com/search?q=Dictionary#dobs=sophistry.  
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misrepresentations of fact or law, and, most significantly, logical 
fallacies. Debunking these prosecutorial arguments is a critical step in 
protecting every person’s right to remain free of conviction unless the 
state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
  
2
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INTRODUCTION 
In theory, the prosecutor’s burden in a criminal case is to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 However, prosecutors have developed 
numerous tactics to effectively lower this burden of proof. One common 
ploy is to argue to jurors that they should not focus on their doubts, but 
rather they should search for the truth of what they think happened. Many 
courts recognize that this argument is improper, as it urges jurors to apply 
a mere preponderance of evidence standard. Other courts, however, take 
the opposite approach: they are complicit in the prosecutor’s burden-
lowering effort by formally instructing jurors “not to search for doubt” 
but instead “to search for the truth.”4 
Defense lawyers have long objected to this truth-related language in 
burden of proof jury instructions. Prosecutors responded that there was 
no evidence to support defense lawyers’ objections. Given this response, 
Lawrence T. White and I conducted and published two controlled 
experiments testing the effect of truth-versus-doubt language on mock 
juror decision-making. Our findings demonstrated, among other things, 
that jurors who were told “not to search for doubt” but instead “to search 
for the truth” convicted at significantly higher rates than those who were 
properly instructed on reasonable doubt.5 
In light of this empirical evidence, defense lawyers have asked trial 
judges to modify their burden of proof jury instructions by deleting the 
 
 3. See Part I. 
 4. See Part II.  
 5. See Part III. 
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offending truth-versus-doubt language. Now that defense lawyers are 
providing the evidence that prosecutors previously claimed did not exist, 
prosecutors have shifted gears by attacking the empirical research in an 
effort to preserve the burden-lowering jury instructions on which they rely 
to convict.6  
Some of these prosecutorial claims, criticisms, and arguments may 
have superficial appeal to a trial judge who is untrained in behavioral 
research. Thus, this Article identifies and debunks the most recent 
prosecutorial spin regarding the published studies. This latest line of 
sophistry includes claims of experimenter and participant bias,7 criticisms 
of study design,8 misrepresentations regarding the studies’ findings,9 
outright fabrications about other aspects of the studies,10 and, most 
significantly, the reliance on several logical fallacies.11 
The Article concludes by reminding courts of the big picture: even 
without empirical research on this topic, the Constitution requires jurors 
to examine the prosecutor’s evidence for reasonable doubt. Therefore, 
courts must not adopt burden of proof instructions—or allow prosecutors 
to make closing arguments—that in any way suggest, or even hint, that 
jurors should apply a lower or different standard of proof.  
I. Gaming the Burden of Proof 
Prosecutors have an ethical duty as a “minister of justice,” which 
includes ensuring that a defendant “is accorded procedural justice.”12 Few 
things are more important to procedural justice than ensuring jurors are 
applying the correct burden of proof. In criminal cases, the Constitution 
protects a defendant from conviction unless the prosecutor proves the 
state’s case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”13 The Supreme Court has 
equated this high level of proof with jurors having “a subjective state of 
near certitude” about the defendant’s guilt.14 Yet, despite their ethical 
obligations, many prosecutors have gone to great lengths to lower or even 
shift the burden of proof, thus increasing their odds of winning a 
conviction.  
 
 6. See Part IV. 
 7. See Parts IV.A. and IV.B. 
 8. See Part IV.C. 
 9. See Part IV.D. and IV.E. 
 10. See Part IV.F. 
 11. See, e.g., Parts IV.G. and IV.H. Logical fallacies are at the heart of most of the prosecutorial 
attacks on the published research.  
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). These model rules 
are adopted, often verbatim, in most states.  
 13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 14. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).  
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The variations of this prosecutorial tactic are countless, but a few 
examples will demonstrate the point. Sometimes, prosecutors will 
trivialize the burden of proof, arguing to jurors that it is no different than 
the standard they use when making decisions in their everyday lives.15 
Other times, prosecutors will present jurors with a false dilemma by 
arguing that, in order to acquit, they would have to find that the state’s 
witnesses—often police officers—were intentionally lying under oath.16 
In some cases, prosecutors will not just lower the burden of proof but 
will actually shift the burden to the defendant. Examples include arguing 
that the defendant is guilty because she decided not to testify,17 failed to 
call enough witnesses at trial,18 or did not present compelling evidence of 
innocence.19 In other cases, prosecutors will completely abandon all 
attempts at subtlety—even the pretense that verdicts should be based on 
evidence—and will argue to the jury: “you have a gut feeling he’s guilty, 
he’s guilty.”20 
One of the most common prosecutorial ploys—and the one that is the 
subject of this Article—comes straight from the politician’s playbook. To 
demonstrate, first consider an example from the national stage. When 
rushing to create legislation in 2001, politicians strained mightily to find 
ten words that could be strung together in a semi-intelligible way to create 
the acronym: USA PATRIOT. The result of their efforts—or possibly 
their interns’ efforts—was an awkward mouthful: “Uniting and 
 
 15. See People v. Nguyen, 40 Cal. App. 4th 28, 36 (1995) (holding that the standard “you use 
every day in your lives when you make important decisions, [including] decisions about whether you want 
to get married,” is much lower than the reasonable doubt standard, as “33 to 60 percent of all marriages 
end in divorce.”).  
 16. See United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1978) (even if jury thought the 
government’s witnesses “probably were telling the truth and that [defendant] probably was lying . . . the 
evidence might not be sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. To tell the jurors they 
had to choose between the two stories was error.”); State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 238 (Conn. 2002) 
(“testimony may be in direct conflict for reasons other than a witness’ intent to deceive”).  
 17. See State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 585 (Tenn. 2014) (prosecutor began rebuttal argument 
“by walking across the court room, facing Defendant, and declaring in a loud voice, while raising both 
arms to point at and gesture toward Defendant, ‘Just tell us where you were! That’s all we are asking, 
Noura!’”).  
 18. See Adams v. State, 566 S.W.2d 387, 387 (Ark. 1978) (prosecutor asked jury, “How many 
witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?”).  
 19. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1997) (prosecutor argued to jury 
that “the defendant has the same responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling 
case.”).  
 20. Randolph v. State, 36 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added). This ethically-challenged 
prosecutor ascended to the bench where he encountered more ethics-related problems. See Mauricio R. 
Hernandez, Vegas Judge Had Long History of Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE IRREVERENT LAWYER 
(May 31, 2017), https://lawmrh.wordpress.com/2017/05/31/vegas-judge-had-long-history-of-
prosecutorial-misconduct/. A different prosecutor made a similar but subtler argument: “We all know 
better in our heart of hearts exactly what went on here. And when you know inside your heart of hearts, 
you know we have met our burden of proof . . . .” People v. Max, 980 N.E.2d 243, 253 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2012).  
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Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”21 Such branding allowed the Act’s 
supporters to paint anyone opposing it as unpatriotic—even when such 
opposition was rooted in a concern for constitutional rights, one of the 
most patriotic stances a politician could take. 
At first blush, this political example might not seem analogous to 
prosecutorial tricks designed to lower the burden of proof. But just as 
politicians hijacked the word “patriot” to label objectors as unpatriotic, 
some prosecutors have used a similar tactic by hijacking the word “truth.” 
That is, by equating their quest for a conviction with a noble search for 
the truth, prosecutors not only align themselves with truth and justice,22 
but simultaneously brand defense lawyers as obfuscators who are 
attempting to hide the truth by creating doubt.23  
II. Flying the Truth Flag 
“[T]ruth and doubt are two separate concepts: truth refers to a judgment 
about whether something happened; doubt refers to the level of certainty 
in that judgment.”24 Therefore, in closing arguments to the jury, defense 
lawyers essentially argue that the prosecutor’s evidence does not rise to 
the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecutors, on the other 
hand, should be arguing—assuming the evidence supports such an 
argument—that he or she has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
But rather than meeting their burden of proof head on, many 
prosecutors skirt their ethical obligations and the defendant’s 
constitutional protections. Prosecutors do this by arguing that, instead of 
evaluating the evidence for reasonable doubt, the jury should dispense 
with the endeavor entirely. As one prosecutor explained it to a jury, “I ask 
that you search for the truth. When you go back into that jury room, you 
search for the truth, not . . . reasonable doubt.”25 On appeal, the court 
condemned the prosecutor’s superficially-appealing argument: 
 
 21. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 22. Prosecutors are able to do this because, for a variety of reasons, they enjoy an unearned 
reputational advantage straight out of the gate. See Abbe Smith, Can You be a Good Person and a Good 
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 355 (2001) (“Somehow, it is understood that prosecutors 
have the high ground. Most people simply assume that prosecutors are the good guys, wear the white hats, 
and are on the ‘right’ side.”). 
 23. Contrary to the general perceptions about prosecutors, defense lawyers suffer a disadvantage 
with regard to reputation. See id. at 356 (“In a social climate that exalts crime control over everything 
else, defenders are barely tolerated.”).  
 24. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An Empirical Test of Criminal 
Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2016) [hereinafter Cicchini & White, Empirical Test]. 
 25. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).  
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A criminal trial may in some ways be a search for truth. But truth is 
not the jury’s job. And arguing that the jury should search for truth 
and not for reasonable doubt both misstates the jury’s duty and 
sweeps aside the State’s burden. The question for any jury is whether 
the burden of proof has been carried by the party who bears it. In a 
criminal case, the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The jury cannot discern whether that has occurred without 
examining the evidence for reasonable doubt.26 
 
Or, as a different appellate court explained, the phrase “‘seeking the 
truth’ suggests determining whose version of events is more likely true, 
the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby intimates a 
preponderance of evidence standard.”27 Such a low burden of proof, of 
course, falls well below the constitutionally-mandated standard for 
criminal cases.  
But other courts disagree. And, to make matters worse, some trial 
judges will even aid and abet prosecutors in their burden-lowering efforts. 
For example, after explaining the concept of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, one judge instructed jurors to “[d]etermine what you think the truth 
of the matter is and act accordingly.”28 Similarly, other judges have 
instructed jurors that, when reaching their verdict, they should “evolve 
the truth,”29 “seek the truth,”30 “search for truth,”31 or “find the truth.”32 
In some states, it is a handful of rogue judges who act as a “party to” 
this prosecutorial “crime.” In other states, the problem is institutionalized. 
One statewide jury instruction committee—a committee that is comprised 
of sitting judges, nearly all of whom are former prosecutors33—uses a 
pattern instruction that decimates the burden of proof. It caps off its 
 
 26. Id. at 411-12 (finding the prosecutor’s argument to be error but holding that, because “the 
impropriety was easily curable, especially in light of the court's instructions,” defense counsel’s failure to 
object waived the issue). 
 27. United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 28. State v. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 29. United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
 30. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d at 1223; see also State v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411, 417 (Me. 
1995) (“The court instructed the jury to seek truth . . .”); State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 (S.C. 2000) 
(“[I]nstructing the jury its ‘one single objective’ was ‘to seek the truth.’”); State v. Benoit, 609 A.2d 230, 
231 (Vt. 1992) (“During jury instructions, the trial judge twice referred to a jury’s duty to ‘seek the 
truth.’”). 
 31. Commonwealth v. Allard, 711 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Mass. 1999); see also People v. Walos, 229 
A.D.2d 953, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (instructing the jurors that the trial was a “search for the truth”); 
State v. Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 866 (S.C. 1998) (instructing the jurors that they should be “in search of 
the truth”) (emphasis omitted). 
 32. United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 33. See Michael D. Cicchini, The Battle over the Burden of Proof: A Report from the Trenches, 79 
U. PITT. L. REV. 61, 85-86, n. 131-36 (2017) [hereinafter Cicchini, Report from the Trenches]. 
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already flawed discussion of reasonable doubt by specifically warning 
jurors: “you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.”34 
When defense lawyers have objected to this truth-related language—
whether used in a prosecutor’s argument, an instruction from the trial 
judge, or both—the common prosecutorial rebuttal was that defense 
lawyers’ concerns were merely “personal opinion,” unsupported by 
evidence.35 In response to this call for evidence, psychology professor 
Lawrence T. White and I decided to empirically test the truth-related 
language that prosecutors contend has no burden-lowering effect, yet—
for reasons they cannot articulate—still fight vigorously to preserve. 
III. The Empirical Evidence36 
In our first study, we recruited participants to serve as mock jurors in a 
hypothetical criminal case.37 Each juror received identical case summary 
materials, including: the elements of the charged crime, a summary of the 
witnesses’ testimony, and the lawyers’ closing arguments.38 Before 
rendering their verdicts, however, jurors were randomly assigned to three 
groups, each of which received a different instruction on the burden of 
proof.39 
We first hypothesized that truth and doubt were, in fact, two distinct 
concepts, and that jurors who were instructed only to search for the truth 
(“truth only”) would convict at a higher rate than jurors who were 
properly instructed on reasonable doubt (“doubt only”).40 The results 
supported this hypothesis. Jurors who received a truth-only instruction 
voted to convict 29.6% of the time, while jurors who received the legally 
proper doubt-only instruction voted to convict 16% of the time.41 
Next, we hypothesized that jurors who were first properly instructed on 
reasonable doubt but then told “not to search for doubt” and instead “to 
search for the truth” (“doubt-and-truth”) would convict at a higher rate 
than jurors who received the legally proper doubt-only instruction.42 The 
 
 34. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017) (emphasis added). For the other three defects 
in the instruction, see Michael D. Cicchini, Instructing Jurors on Reasonable Doubt: It’s All Relative, 8 
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 72 (2017). 
 35. See State’s Trial Court Memorandum, Wisconsin v. Yusuf, No. 2015-CF-911 (Cir. Ct. 
Kenosha Cty. 2015) (on file with the author). 
 36. This Part, including the footnotes and table, is reproduced with minor modifications from 
Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 68-70. 
 37. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1150. 
 38. Id. at 1151. 
 39. Id. at 1152. 
 40. Id. at 1150. 
 41. Id. at 1154. 
 42. Id. at 1150. 
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results also supported this hypothesis. The conviction rate for jurors who 
received the doubt-and-truth instruction jumped back up to 29%—a rate 
statistically identical to that of jurors who received no reasonable doubt 
instruction whatsoever.43 The following table clearly conveys these 
results: 
 
Burden-of-Proof Instruction 
Conviction 
Rate 
A clearly unconstitutional “search for the 
truth” instruction with no mention whatsoever 
of beyond a reasonable doubt (truth only) 
29.6% 
 
 
A legally proper beyond a reasonable doubt 
instruction (doubt only) 
 
16.0% 
 
 
An otherwise legally proper beyond a 
reasonable doubt instruction that concludes 
with a mandate “not to search for doubt” but 
“to search for the truth” (doubt-and-truth) 
 
29.0% 
 
 
 
In our second study,44 we conducted a conceptual replication45 of the 
first study. To test the strength of our primary finding, we again 
hypothesized that the doubt-and-truth instruction would produce a higher 
conviction rate than a legally proper doubt-only instruction.46 Again, the 
results supported this hypothesis. In the second study, the two conviction 
rates were 33.1% (doubt-and-truth) and 22.6% (doubt only).47 
Next, we hypothesized that jurors who received the doubt-and-truth 
instruction would be more likely to mistakenly believe that conviction 
was proper even if they had a reasonable doubt about guilt.48 This 
hypothesis—tested through a post-verdict question—was supported by 
the results. Jurors in the doubt-and-truth group were nearly twice as likely 
 
 43. Id. at 1155. 
 44. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury Instructions 
on Verdicts: A Conceptual Replication, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2017) [hereinafter Cicchini & 
White, Conceptual Replication]. 
 45. Regarding the importance of replication, see Stefan Schmidt, Shall We Really Do It Again? 
The Powerful Concept of Replication is Neglected in the Social Sciences, 13 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 90, 91 
(2009). 
 46. Cicchini & White, Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 28. 
 47. Id. at 30–31. 
 48. Id. at 28. 
9
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as jurors in the doubt-only group to hold this mistaken belief (28% and 
15%, respectively).49 We also found that, regardless of the group to which 
jurors were assigned, jurors who held this mistaken belief were far more 
likely to convict than jurors who properly understood the burden of proof 
(54% and 21%, respectively).50 
IV. Spin Cycle 
The findings discussed above strongly support defense lawyers’ claim 
that telling jurors “not to search for doubt,” but instead “to search for the 
truth,” lowers the burden of proof below the constitutionally-mandated 
standard. In response, prosecutors have unleashed a torrent of criticisms 
aimed at discrediting the two studies. Their goal is to preserve the truth-
based reasonable doubt instruction, which, in turn, permits them to 
exacerbate its burden-lowering impact by repeating its message in closing 
arguments to the jury.  
 When criticizing the published studies, many prosecutors have 
demonstrated skill in the art of sophistry. They are masters at subtly 
dropping multiple claims—claims that are always fallacious but 
sometimes superficially appealing—into only one or two short sentences. 
Unfortunately for defense lawyers, these criticisms are very much like 
landmines: they are easy to lay, but difficult and time-consuming to 
cleanup. 
 This Article will now debunk several prosecutorial criticisms of the 
published studies—studies that empirically demonstrate the burden-
lowering effect of the mandate “not to search for doubt” but instead “to 
search for the truth.”  
A. The Hypothesis Bias 
The first step in behavioral research is to formulate a hypothesis that 
can be empirically tested. Yet, prosecutors have found a way to spin even 
this fundamental concept to the state’s advantage. With regard to the first 
published study, one prosecutor argued that because it posited a 
hypothesis, it was biased from its inception. The prosecutor elaborated:  
 
The first problem is that the entire premise of the [study] was biased 
from the start. The authors were not searching for the truth: they 
were not looking to see what effect various instructions might have 
in a mock trial situation. What they were searching for was evidence 
 
 49. Id. at 32. 
 50. Id.  
10
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to back their contention that an instruction that urges jurors to search 
for the truth will lead to more convictions than an instruction that 
urges jurors to search for doubt.51 
 
Before addressing the prosecutor’s argument that the study was “biased 
from the start,” it is important to recognize that he also misrepresented the 
substance of our work. (This is an excellent example of a prosecutor 
subtly dropping multiple criticisms into a small space.) We did not 
compare an instruction that urges jurors to search for truth with one that 
“urges jurors to search for doubt.” Rather, one instruction in our study 
was the pattern instruction as it is given to jurors. The other instruction 
was identical, except that it deleted the last fourteen words: “you are not 
to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.”52 
Neither of the instructions “urge[d] jurors to search for doubt.” To the 
contrary, both went to great lengths to warn jurors that, if they had a 
doubt, it was probably not a reasonable one and therefore should not be 
used to acquit. Specifically, the instructions both warned jurors that a 
doubt “based on mere guesswork or speculation,” or that arises “from 
sympathy or from fear to return a verdict of guilt,” or that is used “to 
escape the responsibility of a decision” is not a reasonable doubt.53 In 
other words, both instructions “convey[ed] a message to the jurors: The 
judge would not have presented so many ways in which the juror’s doubts 
can be used improperly if this were not the main problem to avoid.”54 
 Returning, then, to the prosecutor’s primary criticism: he argued that 
the study was “biased from the start” because we hypothesized that certain 
language would increase the conviction rate or, alternatively stated, 
would lower the burden of proof. In making this argument, he is likely 
attempting to redirect a criticism that is often aimed at police and 
prosecutors: confirmation bias. This phenomenon occurs when, for 
example, a government agent decides early on that the suspect (or 
suspect-turned-defendant) is guilty, and then seeks out information to 
confirm this preexisting belief while ignoring or minimizing information 
that contradicts it.55 
However, confirmation bias in an uncontrolled setting, such as a police 
investigation, is dramatically different than formulating a hypothesis and 
 
 51. Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration of Decision Modifying Burden of Proof Jury 
Instruction, Wisconsin v. Linde, No. 2016-CF-193 (Cir. Ct. Dodge Cty. 2017), at 2 (quoting the 
prosecutor) [hereinafter “Decision Re: Motion”] (on file with the author). 
 52. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1152-54. 
 53. Id. at 1153-54. 
 54. Lawrence Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About 
Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 144 (1999).  
 55. See Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 329 (2015) (discussing 
the prosecutorial win-at-all-costs mentality and citing several sources of confirmation bias). 
11
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then empirically testing it in a double-blind controlled experiment.56 The 
trial judge kindly gave the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt when he 
responded: “[t]he State misunderstands research methodology.”57 
The judge then elaborated by explaining the concept of the null 
hypothesis. “The null hypothesis is that . . . conviction rates should be 
equal regardless of the instruction. Empirical proof must overcome the 
presumption that the null hypothesis is true before an alternative 
hypothesis can be accepted.”58 The judge concluded as follows: “[t]he 
positing of hypotheses is not bias, but is the first step in scientific 
investigation. The empirical results from sound methods are what inform. 
If the empirical difference . . . is statistically significant, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the posited hypothesis is accepted.”59  
Given the way scientific investigations proceed—by first stating 
hypotheses and then testing them—the prosecutor’s argument, if 
accepted, would also lead to an absurd conclusion: the mere existence of 
a study would be evidence of its bias. It would then follow that all of the 
findings from the social sciences (and the physical sciences, for that 
matter) should be discarded not because of any identifiable 
methodological flaw, but merely because the studies exist. 
B. Random Sampling and Biased Jurors 
Sometimes, prosecutors attempt to articulate specific methodological 
flaws in the studies. However, such attempts are often the product of 
scientific illiteracy or, in many cases, bad faith spin doctoring. 
For example, one prosecutor argued that the studies are unreliable 
because we did not recruit test participants through “random sampling,” 
which the prosecutor claimed “is the foundation of valid empirical 
research.”60 However, the same prosecutor then complained that the 
studies were also unreliable because we failed to “weed-out those with 
preconceived ideas.”61 
 
 56. Using online research platforms allows for double-blind studies that dramatically reduce, if 
not eliminate, participant and experimenter biases. See Matthew J. C. Crump, et al., Evaluating Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Research, 8(3) PLOS ONE e57410 2 (2013) 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0057410 (because “the experimenter 
never directly meets or interacts with the anonymous participants, it minimizes the chance the 
experimenter can influence the results.”). 
 57. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 3. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). As discussed in both studies, the differences in conviction rates 
between test groups were statistically significant. Statistical significance is measured by a statistic called 
the p-value. The lower the p-value, the more confident we can be that the difference between two test 
groups did not occur by chance. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1154-56. 
 60. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 4 (quoting the prosecutor). 
 61. Id. at 5 (quoting the prosecutor). 
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The prosecutor’s first mistake was that he threw two mutually 
exclusive complaints against the same metaphorical wall, hoping that at 
least one would stick. He first criticized the studies because the 
participants were not randomly selected; he then immediately shifted 
gears, claiming that the participants were randomly selected but shouldn’t 
have been. It is simply not possible to have both random sampling and 
nonrandom sampling in the same study. The trial judge responded:  
 
The . . . argument of the State is that the samples used by [Cicchini 
& White] were not random . . . .62 The State then argues that the 
sample that was used . . . should not have been random but the 
participants should have been screened through a voir dire process 
to weed-out those with pre-conceived ideas. If voir dire would have 
occurred, the sample would have been biased based on the 
subjective bias of the person(s) doing the voir dire (and striking 
possible study participants) resulting in the study’s validity being 
compromised by the subjectivity of those doing the voir dire.63 
 
In other words, the prosecutor can’t have it both ways. His other 
mistake was even more fundamental: he feigned concern about random 
sampling and participant bias. In doing so, he confused two types of 
studies: surveys and experiments. A survey uses a sample to forecast the 
frequency of some characteristic—for example, support for marijuana 
legalization—in the larger population.64 Therefore, it is very important 
that survey participants are selected randomly in order to be 
representative of the larger population.65 
Experiments, on the other hand, are designed to detect differences 
between two or more test conditions and seek to answer a different type 
of question. For example, in our jury-instruction experiments, we were 
interested in learning the answer to the research question: all else being 
equal, will mock jurors who receive instruction A vote guilty more often 
than those who receive instruction B? 
Bias in experiments is still a concern, of course. But had the prosecutor 
simply read the study that he was condemning, he would have learned 
that participant bias in experiments (as opposed to surveys) is addressed 
through random assignment (as opposed to random sampling). As we 
explained in our original study:  
 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. Id. at 5-6 (italics omitted).  
 64. See BETH MORLING, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY: EVALUATING A WORLD OF 
INFORMATION 173 (2012) (discussing how sample selection is far more important for a survey, or 
“frequency claim,” than it is for controlled experiments that seek to detect “associations and causes”). 
 65. See id. 
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The virtue of random assignment is that, when used with large 
numbers of study participants, it produces groups that are 
statistically equivalent to each other in all respects. Each group has 
roughly the same number of mock jurors, the same number of men 
and women, the same number of well-educated and poorly educated 
persons, and the same number of biased and unbiased individuals. 
When test groups are statistically equivalent at the outset, receive 
different jury instructions, and then convict at different rates, we can 
be quite certain that the different conviction rates were produced by 
the different jury instructions and not by personal characteristics of 
the mock jurors in a particular group.66 
 
Because the prosecutor launched mutually exclusive criticisms at the 
same time and disregarded the text of the study he was condemning, this 
set of criticisms fails.  
C. The Case of the Missing Instructions 
One prosecutor took issue with the two published studies because of 
the way the mock jurors were instructed. He argued that the studies were 
not reliable because, in real-life trials, jurors “are repeatedly instructed 
not to convict unless the state has proved guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”67 Specifically, he argued, “[t]his admonition is given (1) when 
charges are announced, (2) after the enumeration of each element of the 
charged offense, (3) immediately preceding the text Cicchini objects to, 
and (4) in various additional instructions”68 such as “self-defense,” 
“circumstantial evidence,” “where identification of defendant is in issue,” 
and the “lesser included offense.”69 
To recast the prosecutor’s claim in more scientific terms, he is 
essentially arguing that the studies rated poorly in terms of “external 
validity,” i.e., they failed to properly mimic features in real-world 
criminal jury trials.70 External validity is one of four interrelated validities 
 
 66. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1165. For further discussion of random 
assignment, see Morling, supra note 64, at 251-52 (Random assignment “creates a situation in which the 
experimental groups will become virtually equal . . . .”).  
 67. Michael Griesbach, Meeting the Challenge to Wisconsin’s Criminal Jury Instruction 140, WIS. 
L.J. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://wislawjournal.com/2017/11/22/meeting-the-challenge-to-wisconsins-
criminal-jury-instruction-140/. 
 68. Id. (enumeration added). 
 69. Id., n. 6. 
 70. See generally THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: 
DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 70-71 (1979). 
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that are used to evaluate controlled experiments.71 However, the 
prosecutor’s multi-part complaint above does not come close to 
establishing any deficiency in this criterion. 
First, and in no particular order, the prosecutor argued that real-life 
juries would have also been reminded of the reasonable doubt standard in 
additional instructions—such as “self-defense,” “circumstantial 
evidence,” “where identification of defendant is in issue,” and the “lesser 
included offense”—that we failed to include for our test subjects. The fact 
patterns used in our two experiments are discussed in great detail in the 
published studies.72 Both cases involved allegations of sexual touching. 
Not surprisingly, “self-defense” was therefore not an issue. Further, both 
cases hinged on direct evidence without any “circumstantial evidence” at 
all.73 Additionally, neither case included an “identification of [the] 
defendant” issue because the first case involved two people who knew 
each other, and the second case included a stipulation on identity. Finally, 
neither case had facts supporting a “lesser included offense.” Thus, no 
such instruction was provided to the mock jurors. Therefore, our test 
participants did not receive these additional instructions because real-life 
jurors would not have received them. 
Second, the prosecutor accurately states that the concept of reasonable 
doubt is explained in the jury instruction “immediately preceding the text 
Cicchini objects to.” This is true, but it is a red herring. Why? Because 
we tested the entire instruction, including the part that the prosecutor 
claims was omitted. This would have been obvious had the prosecutor 
merely skimmed the published study.74  
Third, the prosecutor argues that, in real-life jury trials, reasonable 
doubt is mentioned “after the enumeration of each element of the charged 
offense.” While such substantive instructions do state that the prosecutor 
must prove all of the crime’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt,75 they 
 
 71. See id. at 37-38. 
 72. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1150-51; Cicchini & White, 
Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 28-29. 
 73. Many prosecutors request the circumstantial evidence jury instruction even when a case is 
based entirely on direct evidence. This might be due to their failure to grasp the difference between direct 
and circumstantial evidence, or it could be yet another burden-lowering prosecutorial ploy. That is, 
prosecutors tend to like the instruction because, despite its reference to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it may have its own type of burden-lowering effect when it informs the jury: “It is not necessary that every 
fact be proved directly by a witness or an exhibit.” WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 170 (2017).  
 74. See Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1152-54. Our second study was a 
conceptual replication of the first, and the changes included, among other things, a different discussion of 
reasonable doubt that immediately preceded the unconstitutional closing mandate. Despite this, we still 
observed a statistically significant, burden-lowering effect of the closing mandate. See Cicchini & White, 
Conceptual Replication, supra note 44, at 29-30. 
 75. See, e.g., WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 2110 (2018) (“If you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all five elements of this offense have been proved, you should find the defendant 
guilty.”). 
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do not do so after “each element,” as the prosecutor claims. Nor do such 
substantive instructions explain, discuss, or define reasonable doubt. 
Rather, that is done, not surprisingly, in the burden of proof instruction 
(which was the entire purpose and focus of our experiment). Therefore, 
in the controlled experiments—which are necessarily abbreviated relative 
to a lengthy jury trial—we provided jurors with the elements of the 
charged crime. However, we identified the reasonable doubt standard in 
the burden of proof instruction where the phrase is also defined and 
explained. 
Fourth, the prosecutor argues that real-life juries are also instructed on 
reasonable doubt at the beginning of the trial “when charges are 
announced,” and we did not include this type of introductory instruction 
for our test participants. But when a real-life judge discusses reasonable 
doubt at the beginning of trial, he or she does so by reading the full jury 
instruction on the burden of proof,76 which also includes the offending 
truth-related language. This is, of course, the exact instruction that we 
tested. Had we included the instruction twice in such a relatively small 
space—a compressed case summary in a controlled experiment—it likely 
would have exacerbated its burden-lowering impact and the prosecutor 
would be complaining about that instead. “As Roseanne Rosannadanna 
used to say, ‘If it’s not one thing, it’s another.’”77 
Amazingly, the prosecutor launched this multi-part criticism even 
though we had already addressed these issues. In our first study, we 
explained that our design was intentionally conservative and would 
probably underestimate the impact of the truth-related language in the 
jury instruction: 
  
[J]urors were instructed only once on the burden of proof. Further, 
in order to hold the case summary constant across groups, the 
lawyers’ closing arguments did not include any reference to the . . . 
burden of proof instructions tested. This, however, is dramatically 
different than real-life trials where juries may be told as many as five 
times “not to search for doubt,” but instead “to search for the truth.” 
The burden of proof instruction is often given verbally before 
opening statements, again before closing arguments, and then in 
writing for the jury’s reference during deliberations. Even more 
harmful, during closing arguments a prosecutor may parrot the 
 
 76. See WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 50 (2017) (listing preliminary instructions, including 
pattern jury instruction no. 140 on the burden of proof which is to be read right before the judge announces 
that “[t]he lawyers will now make opening statements.”). 
 77. MATTHEW STEWART, THE MANAGEMENT MYTH: WHY THE EXPERTS KEEP GETTING IT 
WRONG, 197 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2009) (describing how the consulting industry of the 1990s was 
always shifting the goalposts with its stream of never-ending and constantly changing theories).  
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court’s instruction and argue to the jurors that they must search for 
truth, not doubt. And many prosecutors will do this both in their 
main argument and again in their rebuttal argument—thus leaving 
their “truth trumpet” ringing in the jury’s ears as they begin 
deliberations.78 
 
This prosecutorial closing argument to the jury—the inevitable piling-
on to the jury instruction’s mandate “not to search for doubt” but “for the 
truth”—greatly exacerbates an already serious problem. One trial judge, 
a former prosecutor, explains: 
 
During closing arguments, the defense attorney often argues the 
burden of proof instruction . . . and then the prosecutor, on rebuttal, 
says “Defense counsel read you only part of the jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt. What counsel left out were these two lines: ‘you 
are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.’” 
Prosecutors make this argument because they know that the [jury 
instruction] prohibiting the search for doubt diminishes the beyond 
a reasonable doubt burden of proof and makes it easier for the State 
to obtain a conviction. I have had these lines used against me as a 
defense attorney, and mea culpa, mea culpa, I have used them 
against defense counsel as district attorney.79  
 
 In sum, to the extent our studies do not precisely mirror real-life jury 
trials, as no controlled experiment does, the studies likely underestimated 
the burden-lowering effect of the jury instruction’s closing mandate.  
D. Attacking the Straw Man 
A common prosecutorial trick for nearly any situation is to create an 
unpersuasive argument, attribute that argument to the defense lawyer, and 
then attack the argument. To illustrate this, consider the defense that the 
police were mistaken in their identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator. One prosecutor responded to this defense by arguing to the 
jury that “[w]hile defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not saying the 
police are lying; what else are they saying? There’s no other reasonable 
explanation, and it kind of frustrates me knowing and working in this field 
 
 78. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1157. 
 79. Hon. Steven Bauer, Why Wisconsin's Criminal Burden of Proof Instruction Had to be 
Changed, TO SPEAK THE TRUTH (Oct. 24, 2017), http://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2017/10/why-
wisconsins-criminal-burden-of-proof.html (internal footnote, questioning the ethics of this prosecutorial 
argument, omitted). 
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and knowing these officers; and you know them now too.”80 
What the defense lawyer was saying, of course, was perfectly clear: the 
police were mistaken. On appeal, the court explained that the prosecutor 
was expressing his “self-imposed frustration at his own proposed 
suggestion that testifying police officers may have lied.”81 In reality, as 
the court recognized, the “defense was mistaken identity,” not police 
perjury.82 
Prosecutors have also pulled this straw-man tactic out of their bag of 
tricks when attacking the two published studies on the burden of proof. 
For example, one prosecutor argued that I was claiming Wisconsin’s 
reasonable doubt instruction “makes it twice as likely for jurors to convict 
defendants.”83 The prosecutor then added that “[i]t is—well—reasonable 
to doubt Cicchini’s claims,” and proceeded to attack the claim he had just 
attributed to me.84 However, in trying to make my position appear 
untenable, the prosecutor misstated the studies’ findings and my claims 
about them.  
First, in the controlled studies, the conviction rates did not double. In 
the original study, the conviction rate nearly doubled when jurors were 
told to disregard doubt in favor of a search for the truth.85 In the 
conceptual replication—a study that included stronger evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt and larger sample sizes of participants—the conviction 
rate increased by nearly fifty percent among jurors who received the truth-
related mandate.86 Although the differences were not as great as the 
prosecutor’s strategic exaggeration portrayed them to be, both were 
statistically significant.87 
But second, and more importantly, I have not claimed, nor do the 
studies purport to show, that the offending language in the jury instruction 
“makes it twice as likely for jurors to convict defendants.”88 There is an 
important distinction to be made here. Once again, it centers on a 
prosecutor’s confusion between experiments and surveys. Experiments, 
such as our two published studies, do not attempt to generalize from a 
sample to predict the frequency of a characteristic in the larger 
population.89 We even explained this in the first study that the prosecutor 
now mischaracterizes. We wrote that “while our findings allow us to 
 
 80. State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 859. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Griesbach, supra note 67.  
 84. Id. 
 85. See Part III. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 76. 
 88. Greisbach, supra note 67.  
 89. See Part IV.B. 
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conclude that truth-related language diminishes the burden of proof in 
criminal cases, we cannot know the extent to which this effect will also 
be observed in other cases with different fact patterns.”90 
In other words, in real-life cases that have very strong evidence of guilt, 
jurors are likely to convict regardless of their burden of proof instruction. 
Conversely, in real-life cases that have very weak evidence of guilt, jurors 
are likely to acquit regardless of the instruction. And some cases are so 
weak that jurors would acquit even if the judge told them that the burden 
of proof was on the defense to prove innocence, rather than on the state 
to prove guilt.91  
Therefore, although we can conclude that the truth-related language we 
tested diminishes the state’s burden of proof, precisely how that lower 
burden of proof will translate into a higher conviction rate depends 
significantly on the types of cases being tried. It is simply not possible to 
forecast the extent to which a jury instruction—even an obviously 
defective one—will affect real-word conviction rates for future trials 
involving yet-to-be-known fact patterns.  
Some prosecutors already understand this important distinction, and 
therefore spin the facts in the opposite direction. For example, one 
prosecutor seized upon the language from our first study—that “we 
cannot know the extent to which this effect will also be observed in other 
cases”92—and argued that the judge should disregard the studies because 
“[e]ven the authors acknowledge that the results could be different in a 
case where there is more evidence of guilt.”93 
Surprisingly, the prosecutor missed the opportunity to label our 
acknowledgment an “admission” or a “concession.” But regardless, the 
prosecutor’s claim is yet another red herring. It is true, as explained above, 
that the instruction could have a greater or smaller effect (or no effect) 
depending upon the strength of the evidence in a given case. However, 
that is certainly not a justification for improperly instructing jurors on 
reasonable doubt, only to hope they will view the evidence as falling near 
one of the two extremes on the strength-of-evidence spectrum (rendering 
the defective burden of proof instruction irrelevant to verdict choice). 
Rather, the court’s duty is to properly instruct the jury in the first place.94  
 
 90. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161. 
 91. This strength of evidence effect has also been observed in numerous controlled studies. For a 
review, see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL. & L. 622 (2001). 
 92. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161. 
 93. State’s Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Modify Jury Instruction 140, Wisconsin v. Avery, No. 
2016-CF-382 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha Cty. 2016), at 5 [hereinafter “State’s Reply”] (on file with the author). 
 94. See, e.g., State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 584 (Wis. 2013) (“A circuit court must, 
however, exercise its discretion in order to fully and fairly inform the jury of the rules of law applicable 
to the case and to assist the jury in making a reasonable analysis of the evidence.”).  
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E. The Printed Page 
As the criticisms pile up, it becomes obvious that prosecutors are not 
carefully reading the studies they are condemning. As yet another 
example, prosecutors argue that asking mock jurors to make “a decision 
about guilt or innocence from nothing more than a few words on a printed 
page”—i.e., the written case summary method we used in both studies—
“ensures unreliable results.”95 
First, this complaint is ironic, given that this same prosecutor’s office 
has no problem convicting real-life defendants by reading “a few words 
on a printed page” into the record at trial, in lieu of a live witness.96 
Second, the written case summaries we used were far more than “a few 
words,” and are described in detail in each of the studies. And third, this 
prosecutorial complaint once again demonstrates willful blindness and 
intentional spin doctoring.  
As we explained in our first study, not only is the written case summary 
method common in controlled experiments, but it also has tremendous 
advantages when a researcher is testing the impact of written jury 
instructions—as opposed to, say, the physical attractiveness bias, racial 
bias, or some other phenomenon—on a verdict.97 We previously 
explained:  
 
First, researchers who use the case summary method can eliminate 
extrajudicial factors, including race and ethnicity, which may have 
an impact on jurors’ decision-making processes. Second, the more 
abbreviated case summary method compresses events in time, 
thereby reducing the pernicious effect of forgetting, which can also 
affect jurors’ decision-making processes. Third, the case summary 
method allows researchers to test the impact of a specific component 
of a trial—in our study, a particular jury instruction—that may get 
lost in the clutter of a more complex trial simulation.98 
 
 Or, as one trial judge recently put it, this prosecutorial criticism of the 
 
 95. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.  
 96. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶ 14-15, 695 N.W.2d 259, 263. In Stuart, the prosecutor’s 
office filed a mid-trial “emergency petition for review” to permit it to read a preliminary hearing transcript 
into evidence at trial. The office won its petition and convicted the defendant at trial based in large part 
on “a few words on a printed page”—the very thing it now condemns in the context of controlled 
experiments. Fortunately for the real-life defendant in Stuart, his conviction was eventually reversed for 
a confrontation clause violation.  
 97. For a discussion and citation to numerous studies, see Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra 
note 24, at 1160-61. See also Michael D. Buhrmester, et al., An Evaluation of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
Its Rapid Rise, and Its Effective Use, 13.2 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 149, 149 (2017) 
(“thousands of social scientists from seemingly every field have conducted research using the platform.”). 
 98. Cicchini & White, Empirical Test, supra note 24, at 1161. 
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written case summary method is yet another red herring.  
 
[I]t is a red herring because in no way does not using live witnesses 
undermine the validity of [the study]. One could have presented live 
witnesses, but that would have been a different study. As long as the 
variable of the story told in the study was consistent among groups, 
how the story is told makes no difference—the differences between 
groups would not be biased.99 
 
And as explained earlier, in a controlled experiment (as opposed to a 
survey) it is this difference between test groups that is informative.  
F. Misrepresentations and Mystery Flaws 
As demonstrated in Part IV.D. on straw man arguments, one of the 
simplest ways for prosecutors to attack the burden of proof studies is 
simply to misrepresent their findings. Making misrepresentations—
whether about the findings or some other aspect of the studies—has two 
advantages for prosecutors. First, because misrepresentations are, at best, 
only loosely tethered to the facts, they are incredibly easy for prosecutors 
to generate but especially time-consuming for defense lawyers to rebut. 
And second, when repeated enough times, a misrepresentation—no 
matter how far removed from reality—will eventually be accepted as true.  
A common prosecutor misrepresentation and argument is that the 
studies have not been peer reviewed, i.e. replicated, and therefore, the 
judge should continue to use the closing mandate that jurors should search 
for truth instead of doubt.100 This prosecutor ploy is flawed in three ways.  
First, peer review and study replication are not the same thing and 
should not be confused. Peer review simply means that, before a journal 
extends an offer of publication, the editors will send the article to one or 
more anonymous “peers” outside of the journal to provide comments. 
This process has been the subject of much criticism, and the quality of 
peer review depends, of course, on the knowledge and effort of the 
anonymous reviewers.101 (Prosecutors—who have launched a steady 
stream of ad hominem attacks against me since the studies were 
published102—would be alarmed to learn that I have been invited to be a 
 
 99. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 100. See State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5. 
 101. See Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 
J. ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE 178 (2006); Steven Lubet, Law Review v. Peer Review: A Qualified 
Defense of Student Editors, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017).  
 102. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 77-79. 
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reviewer for a peer-reviewed journal on police practices.103) On the other 
hand, study replication means that a study has been reproduced—either 
directly or conceptually—in a subsequent study, and the findings of the 
original study have been supported.104  
Second, it is true that, while the University of Richmond journal that 
published our original study uses a competitive selection process, it likely 
did not solicit peer comments before offering to publish our work. 
However, other journals that offered to publish our study may have done 
so.105 The Columbia University journal that published our replication 
study is not only highly selective but does solicit peer comments.106 
Contrary to prosecutors’ claims, our second study was peer reviewed107—
for whatever that is worth. Further, as is obvious from our article’s 
subtitle, “a conceptual replication,” the study did replicate the results of 
our original work.108 
Third, based on these two misrepresentations of fact regarding study 
replication and peer review, the prosecutor claims that judges should 
preserve the pattern instruction’s truth-related closing mandate. But even 
if the prosecutor’s first two claims were true—i.e., if the Richmond study 
was not replicated and the Columbia study was not peer reviewed—these 
claims still would not lead to the conclusion that the court should maintain 
the pattern instruction in its current form. The prosecutor is committing 
the fallacy known as “denying the antecedent.”109  
This type of logical fallacy resonates with some judges. For example, 
in a recent case, a defense lawyer cited the two published studies in 
support of his motion to modify the pattern jury instruction. After oral 
 
 103. E-mail from Robert D. Hanser, Ph.D., Associate Managing Editor, POLICE PRACTICE AND 
RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:04 a.m. C.S.T.) (“I would be grateful if you 
would kindly agree to act as a reviewer”) (on file with the author).  
 104. Study replication is highly desirable, but relatively rare. See Benedict Carey, Many Psychology 
Findings Not as Strong as Claimed, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/science/many-social-science-findings-not-as-strong-as-claimed-
study-says.html. 
 105. Law review articles are submitted to multiple journals simultaneously, and we received offers 
to publish our study from the American Criminal Law Review, the Florida Law Review, and the NYU Law 
Review Online, among others. Several offers of publication are on file with the author.  
 106. COLUM. L. REV., SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS: PEER REVIEW (“Because peer review of articles 
and essays improves the Columbia Law Review’s selection process and helps to verify piece originality, 
the Review strongly prefers subjecting submitted pieces to peer review, contingent on piece-selection 
timeframes and other extenuating circumstances.”), http://columbialawreview.org/submissions-
instructions/.  
 107. E-mail from Shu-en Wee, Former Editor, COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE (July 11, 2017, 08:28 a.m. 
CST) (“your piece was reviewed by one professor before an offer was extended.”) (on file with author). 
 108. See Part III. Further, we conducted a conceptual replication, rather than a direct replication, in 
part to address the prosecutorial criticism that the results could be different in cases involving more 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See Part IV.D. 
 109. See D.Q. MCINERY, BEING LOGICAL: A GUIDE TO GOOD THINKING 104-05 (Random House: 
2004).  
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argument, the judge in that case said he was not persuaded by the studies 
and therefore, was denying the motion.110 The judge then added, 
“Frankly, Mr. [defense lawyer], I think you can just ask [to modify the 
jury instruction] without going through the statistical stuff, I would 
probably be more inclined to grant it.”111 This is fallacious reasoning. As 
my coauthor and I explained: 
 
It is clearly illogical to assert that an argument has merit per se but 
will be rejected because the meritorious argument is also supported 
by empirical data. Even if the studies had contained some 
methodological weaknesses . . . none of that should cause a judge to 
pivot 180-degrees and deny a motion he would otherwise be inclined 
to grant.112  
 
Finally, when prosecutors are unable to fabricate a specific flaw in the 
studies, they simply resort to unidentifiable mystery flaws. For example, 
as discussed in Part IV.A., one prosecutor claimed our studies were biased 
because we formulated a hypothesis. He then claimed that “[t]his initial 
bias likely affected both the way the study was conducted and the way the 
results were construed.”113 Fortunately, the trial judge in that case 
explained the flaw in the prosecutor’s thinking. 
  
The State’s statement that[] ‘[t]his initial bias likely affected both 
the way the study was conducted and the way the results were 
construed’ is less than persuasive. The State provides [neither] 
evidence nor argument of how bias affected how the study was 
conducted or the presentation of the results. The study was 
apparently biased because the State says it was biased. The Court is 
generally highly skeptical of ipse dixit arguments and refuses to 
accept it on this topic.114  
 
Worse, some prosecutors take these unidentified mystery flaws to the 
next level. After our first published study, I notified my state’s jury 
instruction committee of our findings and requested that it delete the truth-
 
 110. The judge actually made several factual and logical errors en route to denying the defense 
lawyer’s motion. See Motion Hearing Transcript, Wisconsin v. Soppa, No. 16-CM-940 (Cir. Ct. Eau 
Claire Cty. 2016) (on file with the author). 
 111. Id. at 18. 
 112. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Educating Judges and Lawyers in Behavioral 
Research: A Case Study, 53 GONZAGA L. REV. 159, 180 (2017-18) [hereinafter Cicchini & White, Case 
Study]. 
 113. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 2. 
 114. Id. at 3-4. 
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related closing mandate from the burden of proof instruction.115 With the 
amendment, the lengthy instruction would simply conclude: “It is your 
duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt.”116 
The committee—which, at that time, had ten active members and was 
comprised of seven former prosecutors and two former government 
attorneys in other capacities117—declined to change the instruction. So 
now, when defense lawyers cite the study to persuade individual trial-
court judges to modify the instruction on a case-by-case basis, prosecutors 
have responded: “[t]hat study has very serious flaws in it, flaws that 
recently led the Jury Instruction Committee to reject the proposed 
change.”118 However, the prosecutors who make this claim never identify 
any of the “very serious flaws” that purportedly led to the committee’s 
decision. Prosecutors are unable to do so because the committee never 
identified a single flaw, serious or otherwise, in the studies.119 
These prosecutor arguments sound superficially appealing even though 
they have no basis in reality and further, are often contradicted by the 
known facts. Once again, much like landmines, such claims are easy to 
lay, but difficult to cleanup. 
G. Appeals to Authority 
As previously discussed, prosecutors urge trial judges to defer to the 
jury instruction committee because, although the committee offered no 
criticisms of the studies, it still denied the request to delete the 
instruction’s truth-related mandate. In their attempts to build-up the 
credibility of the committee, prosecutors have made additional 
misrepresentations.  
Much like the prosecutor who complained that the studies 
simultaneously used, and did not use, random sampling, other prosecutors 
are throwing inconsistent (and false) claims against the same 
metaphorical wall. For example, one prosecutor urged a trial court to use 
the pattern jury instructions because the committee that drafted it was 
 
 115. Michael D. Cicchini, Letter to Jury Wisconsin Instruction Committee (June 7, 2016), 
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/uploads/JI_com._letter.pdf (last visited June 11, 2018). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 85-87. 
 118. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.  
 119. See E-mail from David Schultz, Reporter, Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee 
(June 29, 2017, 11:19 a.m. CST), 
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/uploads/Letter_from_JI_Committee.pdf (last visited June 11, 2018) 
(stating only that “[t]he committee’s reasoning . . . is reflected in footnote 5 in the attached version of JI 
140”); WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017), n. 5 (offering no comment on, or criticism 
of, the studies, but concluding that, “[a]fter careful consideration, the Committee decided not to change 
the text of the instruction.”).  
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comprised of “a cross-sector [sic] of the legal bar.”120 Another prosecutor, 
however, urged the trial court to follow the committee’s lead because it is 
comprised of specialists—“an eminently qualified committee of legal 
experts.”121 Both claims are false.  
The committee, in its 2018 iteration, is comprised of eleven judges.122 
Eight of the eleven members are former prosecutors, and many were 
career-long prosecutors until they took the bench.123 Four of the 
committee members each have more than twenty years of experience 
putting citizens behind bars; another three each boast more than a 
decade’s worth of such experience.124 Of the three committee members 
who haven’t worked as prosecutors, all have worked as government 
lawyers in other capacities, including quasi-prosecutorial positions.125 
While two of the eleven members have also reported working in “private 
practice,” it is not clear whether they have ever defended a client against 
the government.126 
Quite obviously, this is not a cross-section of the bar. Unlike other 
states, it does not include any defense lawyers, criminal law professors, 
or anyone else from any other part of the legal community.127 More 
importantly, it is not an “eminently qualified committee of legal experts.” 
Rather, it is a group of former prosecutors. In fact, according to the litmus 
test set by the prosecutor who claimed they are “eminently qualified,” 
these judges should be completely disqualified from drafting a burden of 
 
 120. Letter to Trial Court Judge, Wisconsin v. Griesbach, No. 16-CM-630 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty. 
2016) (on file with the author). As far as I can tell, the prosecutor meant to write “cross-section” instead 
of “cross-sector.” 
 121. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 4. 
 122. WISCONSIN JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFFICERS AND STANDING COMMITTEES, WISCONSIN 
COURT SYSTEM (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/committees/docs/judconflist.pdf. 
 123. The website www.ballotpedia.org has “an editorial staff of over 60 writers and researchers” to 
collect and report information on elected officials, including the elected trial court judges that are 
subsequently appointed to Wisconsin’s Criminal Jury Instruction Committee. It reports that Judges Boyle, 
Dallet, Eagon, Hanrahan, Horne, Metropulos, Reynolds, and Rothstein are all former prosecutors, with 
many of them being career-long prosecutors before taking the bench and joining the committee. (This is 
not to say that every single one of the committee’s former prosecutors necessarily opposed the change. 
Members of the defense bar have reported to me that judges Hanrahan and Metropulos have, in their 
courtrooms, each modified the pattern jury instruction in one or more cases at the request of defense 
counsel.)  
 124. Id. Judges Eagon, Horne, Metropulous, and Rothstein each have twenty or more years of 
experience stripping citizens of their liberty. (Again, members of the defense bar have reported to me that 
judge Metropulos has, in his courtroom, modified the pattern jury instruction in one or more cases at the 
request of defense counsel.) 
 125. Id. Judge Rosa, for example, worked in “child support enforcement.”  
 126. Id. Judges Ehlers and Reynolds have experience in “private practice”; Reynolds was also a 
former prosecutor.  
 127. In the state of Washington, for example, the “pattern instructions are drafted and approved by 
a committee that includes judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys.” State v. Bennett, 165 P.3d 
1241, 1243 (Wash. 2007). 
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proof instruction. 
More specifically, the prosecutor, like many prosecutors, urged the 
judge to reject the two published studies on the burden of proof because I 
am a criminal defense lawyer. The prosecutor wrote: “[t]he State objects 
to this court’s reliance on a biased study commissioned, designed, and 
executed by a criminal defense attorney.”128 Similarly, another prosecutor 
wrote: “the fact it was conducted by a criminal defense attorney seriously 
calls into question the validity of [the] study.”129 Attacking me is, by far, 
the most common prosecutorial criticism of the published research. And 
if my employment is a disqualifying factor, then the jury instruction 
committee members, as former prosecutors, should also be 
disqualified.130  
 I have explained elsewhere that this amateurish prosecutorial attack on 
my profession is an invalid form of argument known as the ad hominem 
fallacy.131 So instead of criticizing the committee because it is comprised 
almost entirely of former prosecutors, we must instead look to the 
committee’s reasons for its decision. However, as explained in the 
previous Part, the committee has not offered a single criticism of the 
studies and has not given a single reason why they should be rejected. 
Rather, all this group of former prosecutors has done is cite two very old, 
off point cases.132 
The problem with the committee’s response is that jury instruction 
committees are “charged with providing trial courts with instructions that 
are concise, understandable and accurate.”133 They are not charged with 
blindly following or desperately clinging to old case law. Both cases cited 
by the committee predate the published research by several decades—one 
case is nearly a century old and has nothing to do with burden of proof 
 
 128. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 5.  
 129. This quotation is taken from a prosecutor’s written opposition to a defense lawyer’s motion to 
modify the burden of proof jury instruction. However, the defense attorney that gave me the document 
has not given me permission to cite the source. Arguably, that defense attorney would be required to first 
obtain consent to do so from the former client, even though the source is a public document. See Michael 
D. Cicchini, On the Absurdity of Model Rule 1.9, 40 VT L. REV. 69 (2015) (discussing the absurdity of 
the ethics rule that arguably prohibits attorneys from discussing or sharing even the public aspects of their 
closed cases). 
 130. I realize the distinction between current employment and former employment. However, I have 
no doubt that if I were to retire from practicing law, but continued to publish, prosecutors would still 
criticize my yet-to-be-published work as being written by a former criminal defense attorney.  
 131. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 77-79; Cicchini & White, Case 
Study, supra note 112, at 165-66. 
 132. See WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 140 (2017), n. 5. 
 133. Model Crim. Jury Instructions, MICHIGAN COURTS: ONE COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://courts.mi.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/criminal-jury-instructions/pages/default.aspx (last 
visited June 13, 2018). I can find no such charge for Wisconsin’s committee, which appears to have no 
accountability to anyone, but I suspect even the former prosecutors that comprise the committee would 
have to concede that this should be their objective.  
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jury instructions134 and the other is nearly twenty-five years old.135 
Further, the two cases cited by the committee have not held that the 
truth-related language in the jury instruction is accurate or even desirable, 
let alone required. Rather, the cases have merely upheld defendants’ 
convictions because, the courts claimed, the offending truth-related 
language probably did not lower the burden of proof when considered in 
the context of the entire instruction.136 But such dated commentary has 
now (twice) been empirically tested and debunked.137 
The prosecutors’ deference to the jury instruction committee is 
therefore flawed in two ways. First, the committee members are not 
experts. Second, even if they were experts, they have offered no reasons 
in support of their decision to preserve the instructions’ burden-lowering 
closing mandate. By contrast, my coauthor—a research psychologist with 
a Ph.D.—and I have conducted and published two empirical studies. We 
offer data, analysis, and arguments to support our conclusions. This is 
important, of course, because “[t]he strongest kind of expert evidence 
incorporates the reasons the experts advance for holding a certain 
position.”138  
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are urging judges to accept the decision 
of a group of former prosecutors because this group is allegedly 
“eminently qualified.” Such reliance on expertise—even in situations that 
involve actual experts—is another form of fallacious reasoning. The 
prosecutors are merely saying: the committee members are experts, we 
like the committee members, so “[d]on’t ask any questions, just do as we 
say.”139 
From the perspective of individual trial judges, not only is this unsound 
reasoning, but it conflicts with every trial judge’s duty to exercise his or 
her own discretion in properly instructing the jury on the burden of proof. 
As one trial judge wrote, even though the pro-state, pattern jury 
instructions have been blessed by a committee: 
 
The Court can’t close its eye to the fact that people have been 
wrongfully convicted [and then] later exonerated after serving many 
years in prison. The Court can’t close its eye to empirical evidence 
 
 134. See Manna v. State, 192 N.W. 160 (1923). This case does not involve the burden of proof 
instruction, but rather the court’s instruction to the jury on how to resolve disputes of fact when conflicting 
evidence is presented. For further discussion, see Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 
99-100. 
 135. See State v. Avila, 532 N.W.2d 423 (Wis. 1995). 
 136. Id. at 429-30. The other cited case, Manna, did not even involve a burden of proof jury 
instruction.  
 137. See Part III. 
 138. McInery, supra note 109, at 117 (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. 
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that may help the criminal justice system be more accurate in 
discerning guilt from innocence, and be more faithful to the stricture 
of the Constitution of the United States requiring a criminal charge 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.140  
 
Fortunately, at least twenty other trial court judges have agreed with him 
and have made some modification to the defective burden of proof jury 
instruction.141 
H. Equivocation 
The last piece of prosecutorial spin does not concern the two published 
studies per se, but rather the broader concept of the burden of proof. One 
prosecutor recently argued that the jury instruction’s closing mandate 
“not to search for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth” is preferable 
because “it directs the jury to a neutral objective, finding the truth, rather 
than directing them to look for evidence that supports the position of 
either of the parties—the position of the State to find guilt or the position 
of the defendant to find doubt.”142 This argument is flawed in two ways. 
First, there is nothing neutral about a jury’s job. The Constitution 
requires jurors to presume the defendant’s innocence, which “is not a 
mere slogan but an essential part of the law that is binding upon you.”143 
Then, only after deliberations and upon a unanimous finding that the 
evidence eliminated all reasonable doubt may the jurors convict. That is, 
“[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that fully satisfies or entirely 
convinces you of the defendant’s guilt.”144 The prosecutor’s “neutral 
objective” argument completely ignores these constitutional imperatives. 
The prosecutor does not realize it, but by making this argument—that the 
instruction points the jury to a neutral objective instead of ordering it to 
scrutinize the state’s case for reasonable doubt—she is conceding that the 
closing mandate lowers the state’s burden of proof. 
Second, aside from this constitutional issue, the prosecutor is 
committing the fallacy of equivocation: she is “employ[ing] words with 
multiple meanings for the purpose of deception.”145 Her “neutral 
objective” argument portrays the “search for the truth” as a middle-of-
 
 140. Decision Re: Motion, supra note 51, at 1-2 (emphasis added).  
 141. See WIS. J.I. 140 RESOURCE PAGE FOR LAWYERS, 
http://www.cicchinilawoffice.com/Wis_JI_140.html (listing judges and linking to public court records, a 
written order, and a written decision).  
 142. State’s Reply, supra note 93, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 143. HAW. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 3.02 (2014). 
 144. N.C. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 101.10 (2008). 
 145. McInery, supra note 109, at 107. 
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the-road alternative to which neither party lays claim. But in reality, the 
jury instruction and prosecutorial closing argument uses the phrase 
“search for the truth” in a dramatically different and one-sided way. After 
the defense lawyer argues that there is doubt about guilt, the prosecutor 
argues (parroting the judge’s instruction) that the jury must not search for 
doubt, but for the truth. The prosecutor then, of course, equates “truth” 
with a finding of guilt. As one court recognized, telling the jury to search 
for truth instead of doubt is not neutral, but rather “impermissibly 
portray[s] the reasonable doubt standard as a defense tool for hiding the 
truth.”146 
By arguing that the truth-not-doubt mandate provides the jury with a 
neutral option, and then asserting that this allegedly neutral option passes 
constitutional muster, prosecutors are demonstrating that their sophistry 
knows no limits when a conviction is at stake. 
I. Other Spin Revisited  
When it comes to the burden of proof, prosecutorial spin is unrelenting. 
The arguments debunked in this Article are just the latest—although 
arguably the most interesting—in the constant stream of sophistry that 
began even before the studies were published. 
Previously debunked prosecutor arguments include (1) other 
misstatements regarding legal authority,147 (2) claims based on the 
language of the jury instruction,148 (3) misrepresentations about the 
purpose of the modern jury trial,149 and (4) other attacks on the published 
studies.150 Defense counsel who challenge truth-related language in a 
burden of proof instruction, or in a prosecutor’s closing argument, should 
become familiar with all of these versions of prosecutorial spin.  
V. The Big Picture 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof 
 
 146. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Avila, 
532 N.W.2d at 429 (defendant argued that the instruction would lead the jury to believe “that finding 
doubt would mean not finding the truth”). A more common example of equivocation is when prosecutors 
toy with the word “reasonable.” For example, a prosecutor may first use it to discuss “reasonable doubt,” 
but then subtly shift gears and use it improperly to argue that because the state’s theory of guilt is 
“reasonable,” conviction is proper or even required. See Bobby Green, Reasonable Doubt: Is it Defined 
by Whatever is at the Top of the Google Page?, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933, 944-45 (2017) (discussing 
People v. Cole, 2015 IL App (3d) 120992-U at ¶ 27, and arguing that the prosecutor in that case “was 
trying to play on the word ‘reasonable’”). 
 147. See Cicchini, Report from the Trenches, supra note 33, at 80-87. 
 148. Id. at 88-93. 
 149. Id. at 93-102. 
 150. Id. at 71-80; Cicchini & White, Case Study, supra note 112.  
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recognized in the American legal system, and constitutional due process 
requires its application in cases where a defendant’s life, liberty, and 
property are in jeopardy. It has long been obvious—from the standpoint 
of linguistics, logic, and commonsense—that when a judge instructs 
jurors on reasonable doubt but then tells them to search for the truth (or, 
worse yet, not to search for doubt), such tacked-on language will only 
lower the burden of proof below the constitutionally-mandated standard. 
As one former prosecutor, now judge, has stated: prosecutors love the 
truth-versus-doubt language “because they know that the [jury 
instruction] prohibiting the search for doubt diminishes the beyond a 
reasonable doubt burden of proof and makes it easier for the State to 
obtain a conviction.”151 This is why prosecutors are fighting so vigorously 
to preserve the offending language. If the closing mandate did not lower 
the burden of proof, they would not oppose its deletion.  
The burden-lowering effect of this truth-versus-doubt language is not 
only intuitive, but has now been demonstrated empirically. Consider the 
second of the two published studies—the peer-reviewed, conceptual 
replication study.152 Now consider the simplicity of its design: (1) mock 
jurors in Group 1 received a standard reasonable doubt instruction; and 
(2) mock jurors in Group 2 received the identical instruction but with the 
tacked-on, closing mandate “not to search for doubt” but “to search for 
the truth.”153 
Now consider its two simplest findings. When asked in a post-verdict 
multiple choice question to describe their jury instruction, mock jurors in 
Group 2 were nearly twice as likely (28% compared to 15%) to 
mistakenly believe that conviction was proper even if they had a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.154 Further, jurors who held 
this mistaken belief, regardless of the instruction they received, convicted 
the defendant at a rate nearly two and one half times (54% compared to 
21%) that of those who correctly understood the burden of proof.155 
This is clear, simple, and unsurprising empirical evidence in a peer 
reviewed study. Yet, as this Article has demonstrated, prosecutors 
continue to spin (and even fabricate) information, making outlandish 
arguments in an effort to preserve the burden-lowering language on which 
they rely to get convictions. In doing so, they have demonstrated—
contrary to their duties as ministers of justice156—that they have no regard 
 
 151. Hon. Steven Bauer, supra note 79.  
 152. Cicchini & White, Conceptual Replication, supra note 44. 
 153. Id. at 29-30. 
 154. Id. at 32. This difference is statistically significant, p = 0.01, which means we can be 99% 
certain [1-p] that this difference did not occur by chance. 
 155. Id. With p < .001, we can be even more confident that this difference did not occur by chance.  
 156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
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for the truth, while, at the same time, demanding inclusion of that word 
in the reasonable doubt jury instruction.  
When linguistics, logic, commonsense, and empirical evidence align, 
judges can no longer use burden-lowering language in their jury 
instructions, and they should not permit prosecutors to use such language 
in their closing arguments to the jury. And if prosecutorial spin creates 
confusion about the empirical research, judges should focus on the big 
picture using these three simple steps. 
First, even if the empirical evidence is flawed—or even if the studies 
did not exist at all—the constitutionally-mandated burden is still proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the jury’s duty, therefore, is to 
examine the evidence for reasonable doubt in order to determine if the 
state has met its high burden. And third, any jury instruction language or 
prosecutorial argument that directs jurors to do otherwise—or implies or 
even hints that they should do otherwise—is constitutionally defective 
and must not be tolerated.  
CONCLUSION 
Empirical evidence now demonstrates that truth-related language in 
reasonable doubt jury instructions diminishes the burden of proof below 
the constitutionally-mandated standard.157 Prosecutors, however, have 
shifted their spin machines into high gear to discredit the published 
studies and preserve the truth-based instructions on which they rely.158 
This Article has identified and debunked eight new prosecutorial 
arguments regarding the published research and the burden of proof.  
First, formulating a hypothesis that truth-related language will increase 
conviction rates is not bias. Rather, hypothesis formulation is the first step 
in scientific inquiry. Another step is testing the hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis—that conviction rates will not be affected—must be 
overcome by statistically significant evidence before the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. In both published studies, mock jurors who were 
told “not to search for doubt” but “to search for the truth” convicted at 
significantly higher rates than those who were properly instructed on 
reasonable doubt.159  
Second, random sampling is important for surveys. However, in 
controlled experiments, researchers control for participant bias by using 
random assignment of participants to test groups. This creates groups that 
are statistically equivalent to each other in all respects, thus allowing 
researchers to conclude that observed differences are attributable to the 
 
 157. See Part III. 
 158. See Part IV. 
 159. See Part IV.A. 
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variable being tested—in our case, jury instruction language—rather than 
the personal characteristics of the test participants.160 
Third, with regard to the number of “truth” and “doubt” references in 
the test materials, participants were instructed almost exactly as real-life 
jurors would have been. Further, as we explained in our first study, our 
design was intentionally conservative and therefore, probably 
underestimates the burden-lowering effect of telling jurors “not to search 
for doubt” but instead “to search for the truth.”161 
Fourth, in real-life cases involving very weak or very strong evidence 
of guilt, the truth-related language in the burden of proof instruction may 
have little or no effect on verdicts, i.e., jurors will acquit or convict 
regardless of the instruction. However, this is not a reason to reject the 
studies’ findings. Judges are duty-bound to properly instruct jurors on the 
burden of proof. They must not provide a defective instruction and then 
hope that the evidence falls near one of the two extremes on the strength-
of-evidence spectrum, thus rendering the instruction moot.162 
Fifth, our experiments used the case summary method, i.e., participants 
read a written case summary, rather than watching a video, before 
rendering their verdicts. This method is commonly used in published 
research and is especially well-suited for testing written jury instructions. 
Further, as long as the different test groups received the same information 
in the same format—regardless of whether it was print or video—it is the 
difference between groups that is informative. In other words, all else 
being equal, did participants who received instruction A convict at a 
higher rate than those who received instruction B?163 
Sixth, prosecutors frequently claim that the studies have not been peer 
reviewed, i.e., replicated. However, peer review is not the same as study 
replication. Further, contrary to prosecutors’ claims, the findings of the 
first study were replicated by the second study, and this second study was 
also peer reviewed. But even if the first study had not been replicated in 
a subsequent, peer reviewed study—or even if the studies had some other 
unidentified flaws—it would be a logical fallacy (known as “denying the 
antecedent”) to use this to conclude that the burden-lowering, truth-
related language should be preserved.164 
Seventh, prosecutors frequently commit the ad hominem fallacy by 
attacking the studies’ author, and then arguing that the studies are 
therefore invalid. Prosecutors compound this logical error with a second 
fallacy: an appeal to authority. They claim the truth-related language 
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should be persevered because it was approved by an eminently qualified 
committee of experts. However, this committee of former prosecutors has 
no particular expertise. More importantly, the committee offers no 
reasons for its decision and no criticisms of the studies. To invoke this 
committee as an authority on the matter is merely to plead: “[d]on’t ask 
any questions, just do as [they] say.”165 
Eighth, prosecutors claim that judges should instruct jurors to search 
for the truth instead of doubt because that is a neutral objective. Not only 
does this violate the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, 
but it incorporates yet another logical fallacy: equivocation. That is, when 
making this argument to the trial judge, prosecutors claim that “search for 
the truth” is neutral; however, when arguing to the jury, prosecutors use 
“search for the truth” to paint the reasonable doubt standard “as a defense 
tool for hiding the truth.”166  
Finally, empirical evidence aside, judges should always keep the big 
picture in mind. The Constitution requires the state to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Any language—whether in a jury instruction or the 
prosecutor’s closing argument—that suggests or even hints otherwise is a 
blatant constitutional error.167  
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